BSides Las Vegas 2026

Let's talk about some critical infrastructure that millions of people use every day: Public transportation. In this talk, I'll present some findings that I discovered in the public transportation ecosystem of one of the largest cities in Argentina, impacting more than 1.5 million people daily. Reading code, chaining vulnerabilities, weak access controls, and flawed internal designs, I got full access to core mobility systems, from buses to taxis, including DVRs, transport cards, user data, real-time tracking and administrative panels. We'll walk through the technical exploitation path, the real-world impact and the lessons learned.

ResearchersIgnacio Navarro AR

Rust is rapidly becoming the language of choice for red team tooling, implants, and security-critical software. Yet the offensive security ecosystem has almost no obfuscation tooling for it. Nearly every production obfuscator targets C/C++ binaries or operates on final PE/ELF images; Rust's unique compile pipeline, name mangling, and LLVM IR patterns require a fundamentally different approach.

This talk presents Lyra, an open-source, cargo-native LLVM IR obfuscator for Rust. Lyra intercepts each crate during a normal "cargo build" via RUSTC_WRAPPER, transforms the LLVM IR with a configurable pass pipeline, string encryption, basic-block shuffling, indirect-branch obfuscation, recompiles the result with llc + clang, and substitutes the object before the real MSVC linker runs. Zero changes to the Rust compiler, zero changes to the target project's source code, one flag on the command line.

We walk through the architecture, the engineering challenges unique to Windows/MSVC (UTF-16 response files, allocator-shim object preservation, inkwell's undocumented panic guards), and live before-and-after demonstrations in IDA Pro, Ghidra, and Binary Ninja. We also show a YARA rule that confidently matches a plain demo build returning zero results on the obfuscated binary, and two consecutive unseeded builds producing different hex patterns, defeating a rule written on the first build.

Lyra is released open-source at the time of the talk. All demos are reproducible from the release. Attendees leave with a working tool they can run against their own Rust projects the same day.

ResearchersRafael Felix BRJoão Pedro Tricta BR

Let's talk about some critical infrastructure that millions of people use every day: Public transportation. In this talk, I'll present some findings that I discovered in the public transportation ecosystem of one of the largest cities in Argentina, impacting more than 1.5 million people daily. Reading code, chaining vulnerabilities, weak access controls, and flawed internal designs, I got full access to core mobility systems, from buses to taxis, including DVRs, transport cards, user data, real-time tracking and administrative panels. We'll walk through the technical exploitation path, the real-world impact and the lessons learned.

ResearchersIgnacio Navarro AR

In this talk, we will cover reverse engineering Windows kernel-mode drivers, identifying vulnerabilities, and performing BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attacks. We will learn techniques to exploit driver vulnerabilities in order to bypass EDRs or gain kernel-level permissions. Additionally, we will review BYOVD attacks carried out by real APTs and how they disable EDRs and antivirus software using kernel-mode techniques.

ResearchersDiego Tellaroli BR

Cloud security encounters attacks that elude standard detection. In AWS, unauthorized access keys are a common cause of breaches. The vastness of AWS, over 450 services and 19,000 API actions, complicates threat visibility and exposes gaps in traditional tools. This workshop empowers participants with direct, hands-on experience using the AWS Threat Hunter tool to improve threat detection.

Attendees will focus on building behavioral baselines and leveraging data-driven analysis to detect subtle AWS principal anomalies, enabling more precise detection than traditional event monitoring. Attendees will move beyond standard techniques by building multi-stage detection pipelines that create individualized baselines for each IAM principal and systematically flag personalized deviations, linking outliers directly to risks.

ResearchersRodrigo Montoro BR

I'm an AppSec lead. My job was rolling out security scans in CI. Once the scans shipped, I stayed and fixed the parts of the pipeline nobody else would touch. Six months, solo, on top of the day job. Four AI-driven bots later, this talk focuses on two of them.

The one that worked best: a CVE-fixing bot that's kept us at 0 CVEs for three months and counting. The one that miserably failed: a flaky DB test bot that couldn't see flakiness. To a one-shot AI review, a test that sometimes passes and sometimes fails just looks broken. The DB suite went from 42.3% peak failure rate to near zero, not by automating harder but by ditching the bot and pairing with Claude on each failure by hand.

The fixes were technical (race conditions and cache, mostly) but the reason they didn't get fixed wasn't. People click "Run again" several times a day instead of looking at why. Nobody fixes it until somebody who isn't supposed to does. Walk out and measure your team's rerun rate (I'll share the script). Then go fix the smallest thing nobody else will.

ResearchersAldo Salas MX

Open source packages are the foundation of modern software development. They save time, reduce cost, and accelerate delivery. But every package you install is also a potential entry point for an attacker. This session takes a hands-on approach to understanding software supply chain attacks from both sides of the attack.

On the offensive side, attendees will see how attackers introduce malicious code into a new package release without raising immediate suspicion. We cover how a malicious package establishes a command and control channel during installation, how it reads and exfiltrates environment variables including API keys, cloud credentials, and database connection strings, and how typosquatting tricks developers into installing the wrong package. We use real documented cases across npm, PyPI, and Maven to ground every concept in reality.

On the defensive side, we explore how AI is changing the speed and accuracy of supply chain threat detection. We walk through the architecture of tools like the Elastic Supply Chain Monitor, which watches package registries in real time, generates diffs between old and new releases, and sends those diffs to a large language model for classification. The LLM looks for obfuscated code, unexpected network connections, process spawning, and credential access patterns. When it finds them, it alerts the security team before any developer installs the package.

We also cover the hardening techniques that reduce your attack surface before an incident happens: using lockfiles to pin exact dependency versions, avoiding exposure of dependency files on public websites, using private artifact repositories to control what enters your environment, and integrating automated dependency scanning into your CI/CD pipeline. Attendees will leave with a clear mental model of the threat, a reference architecture for AI-assisted detection, and a practical checklist they can bring back to their team on Monday.

ResearchersPaulo Sarrin MX